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Moscow’s failure to make Ukraine part of its Eurasian economic integration project was a severe blow to 
Russian foreign policy ambitions. Notwithstanding 
Ukraine’s turn to the West, however, Russia has continued 
its integration efforts in the post-Soviet space, resulting in 
the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EAEU) in 2015. The EAEU’s overall economic perfor-
mance has been modest so far, and the organization, con-
sisting of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, and Kyr-
gyzstan, has a long way to go before it achieves its goal of 
forming an EU-style internal market with free movement 
of goods, services, people and capital. But there have been 
tangible achievements in various sectors, and ambitions for 
the future are high. Moldova joined the union as an official 
observer in 2017, and several other countries, including 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, might become observers or 
even EAEU members. The EAEU is 
gaining in international status as it is suc-
cessfully negotiating free trade and/or 
economic agreements with numerous 
other countries, including China. Not-
withstanding current difficulties, the 
EAEU is here to stay, and Europe should 
treat it accordingly. Otherwise, Europe 
might miss a crucial opportunity, while 
Russia, and the whole of Eurasia, contin-
ue to drift eastwards.
Moscow and the EAEU 
Russia was not actively pushing for closer 
relations in the post-Soviet space for a 
long time. During the 1990s, Russia was 
economically weak, but its neighbors 
were even weaker, and therefore, Moscow 
was able to rely on its still formidable 
economic, political and military weight in order to influ-
ence developments in its neighborhood. It was only from 
the early 2000s onwards that Russia’s position in the re-
gion was destabilizing, as Western states and organizations 
began to make inroads. The Baltic states became NATO 
members in 2004, the first oil and gas pipelines circum-
venting Russian territory were built with the help of for-
eign companies, and China started to expand economically 
into Central Asia. 
Moscow’s decision to push for regional economic 
integration was a reaction to these processes. So far, Mos-
cow’s primary interest has not been in the economic side of 
integration (after all, trade with EAEU members accounts 
for only about 6 percent of Russia’s overall trade), but the 
larger geopolitical gains. By establishing the EAEU, Rus-
sia has sought to raise its own political standing in world 
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Key Points
 A further deepening of integration of the EAEU, namely in the 
sphere of energy, is to be expected, and an enlargement of the union 
cannot be ruled out. 
 While geopolitics is the main driver of Russian policy in the region, 
integration within the EAEU is taking place primarily in the area of 
the economy, and the EAEU is establishing trade and economic 
relations with other parties, including China. 
 Given the fast-changing realities on the ground, it is time for Europe 
to recognize the EAEU as an official partner – otherwise, Russia and 
Eurasia will continue to shift towards Asia. 
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affairs. Building this regional organiza-
tion is not, in Moscow’s view, something 
that undercuts globalization, even though 
overall tariffs have been significantly 
raised for non-EAEU members, thereby 
enhancing regional protectionism. On 
the contrary, creating regional economic 
organizations should, in Russian think-
ing, facilitate global trade and interde-
pendency. But unlike previously, this is 
now to be realized through the common 
union. 
This dovetails with another key 
Russian foreign policy goal: to establish 
the union as an integrating link between 
Europe and Asia. Transportation projects 
(including the building of high-speed 
train lines) are high on the agenda, and 
Russia hopes to make the EAEU a par-
ticipant in China’s One Belt and One 
Road Initiative. In May 2018, the EAEU 
signed its first major economic and trade 
agreement with China, which could be 
an important step towards the conclusion 
of a free trade agreement. The union also 
signed an interim agreement with Iran, 
in May 2018, with the purpose of form-
ing a full-scale free trade area in the near future. The 
EAEU is internationally active elsewhere; it has already 
concluded a free trade agreement with Vietnam, in 2016, 
and is currently negotiating free trade and/or economic 
agreements with India, Israel, Singapore, Egypt, and Ser-
bia. Several other countries, including Pakistan, Bangla-
desh, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Mongolia and Syria, are reportedly in-
terested in cooperation as well.
Member states interests and tensions
If Russia’s goal in establishing the EAEU was largely geo-
political in nature, other states have joined for a mixture of 
economic, political, and security considerations. 
First, as each of the EAEU member states is more 
dependent on Russia than vice versa, the union project is 
currently mostly about individual countries aligning them-
selves with Russia, not with each other. Despite deepening 
economic integration, the level of overall internal trade 
among the member states is still low, accounting for only 
14.5 percent of total trade in 2017. By comparison: In the 
EU, 64 percent of trade is between union members. Theo-
retically, most of the trade and other economic issues could 
be dealt with bilaterally, between Russia and the individual 
member states. But since the union is now the framework 
within which economic and trade relations are regulated, 
states dependent on Russia saw advantages in joining, even 
if this resulted in raising formerly low tariffs in order to 
match higher Russian tariffs. 
A second reason why states have joined the union is, 
to some extent, the lack of other options. Economically, 
Russia may be less attractive than the EU, but since mem-
bership in the EU is currently out of the question, Russia is 
the only alternative. Even though the external trade of indi-
vidual members is much higher than internal trade (in the 
case of Russia and Kazakhstan, this is due to the fact that 
these countries export most of their oil and gas outside the 
EAEU area), historical factors have also  fostered closer co-
operation. These manifest themselves not only in integrated 
transportation and energy connections and common tech-
nical standards deriving from Soviet times, but also in the 
socio-cultural sphere. Furthermore, Russia is a major inves-
tor and trade partner for all the other EAEU members, and 
it is the primary destination for labor migration, mostly 
from the Central Asian members and Armenia. 
A third major reason is that by joining the union, 
these states were also serving various other interests: the 
bulk of Kazakhstan’s external trade is currently with Eu-
rope, not Russia, but Astana decided to join partly because 
it hopes to contain Russia within a rules-based organiza-
tion. Also, fearing that Moscow could one day lay claim to 
the northern, Russian-populated part of Kazakhstan, 
Astana has sought to accommodate Russian geopolitical 
interests. Armenia joined because of Russian pressure, but 
also because of promises of cheap energy and in hopes of 
gaining protection against Azerbaijan, Armenia’s main an-
tagonist in the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh. Belarus 
relies to a significant degree on the continuous shipment of 
The EAEU: Key Facts
Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus launched a customs union in 2010, and 
in January 2015 upgraded this to a full-fledged economic union with 
Armenia and (since August 2015) Kyrgyzstan as new members. The 
EAEU is in part modelled after the EU: The Eurasian Economic Commis-
sion (EEC) is the union’s permanent supranational body consisting of 
two representatives from each member state. The EAEU’s non-perma-
nent bodies include the Council of the Commission, an intragovernmen-
tal body consisting of the deputy ministers of each member state, the 
Eurasian Intergovernmental Council, comprising the prime ministers of 
member states, as well as the EAEU Supreme Council, which consists 
of the heads of state and decides on the overall direction of the inte-
gration process. The Supreme Council meets at least once a year and 
selects the members of the EEC Board. Another important institution 
is the Court of Justice, based in Minsk, and the Eurasian Development 
Bank (EDB), with its headquarters in Almaty. The EDB is not formally an 
institution of the EAEU, as it also includes Tajikistan, but it is an impor-
tant organization as it finances numerous development projects in the 
EAEU area, namely in the energy and transportation sectors. 
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cheap Russian oil and gas, and Kyrgyzstan on access to the 
Russian labor market as well as Russian investments and 
loans from the Eurasian Development Bank. 
Most importantly, integration is also something 
that many people see as a natural process. Opinion polls 
conducted by the Eurasian Development Bank indicate 
that in each of the EAEU member states, the population is 
overwhelmingly positively inclined towards the union 
(with the exception of Armenia, where less than 50 percent 
view the EAEU favorably). 
Problems and prospects
Russia accounts for 87 percent of the EAEU’s total GDP 
and constitutes 80 percent of the union’s population. Rus-
sia is also the most important military power; the com-
bined military spending of Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyr-
gyzstan and Belarus amount to less than 4 percent of 
Russia’s defense budget. Because of these massive asym-
metries between Russia and the rest of the EAEU mem-
bers, the cost of a member state dissociating itself from 
Russia could be very high. As the example of Ukraine 
demonstrates, leaving or staying is potentially a matter of 
war and peace. For instance, abandoning the union was 
never an option for the new leaders who came to power 
during Armenia’s “velvet revolution” in spring 2018. 
The member countries are thus very careful in deal-
ing with Russia, but at the same time, they also have con-
siderable leverage. Every time Belarus does not get what it 
wants, it threatens to distance itself from the union, and 
Russia, which is not interested in another conflict, usually 
tries to accommodate Minsk, for example by lowering en-
ergy prices or by writing off debts. Kazakhstan continues to 
conclude agreements with the EU and is 
also negotiating agreements with China; 
this puts pressure on Russia, which will 
have to offer something equally attractive 
within the framework of the EAEU. 
But Russia, too, at times puts its 
economic interests above those of the un-
ion. When, in the wake of Russia’s inter-
vention in Ukraine, the other members of 
the union declined to reply in kind to EU 
economic sanctions, Moscow unilaterally 
imposed sanctions. When Russia sees its 
interests at risk, it tends to disregard the 
restrictions a common regime would 
characteristically impose. 
Despite Russian dominance, it 
would be misleading to view the EAEU 
as Russian empire building, as the Krem-
lin’s key interest is not, in the first place, 
directed towards control of the domestic 
institutions and policies of its neighbors. 
For Russia, the main goal is to make sure 
that no country aligns with other regional 
blocs or centers of power. This could have 
implications for China’s role in Central Asia: if the EAEU 
plays a greater role in regulating external economic and 
trade relations and in coordinating large-scale infrastructure 
projects, such as the ones proposed in the framework of 
China’s One Road and One Belt Initiative, this will ulti-
mately have an impact on China’s room for maneuver in 
Central Asia. At the same time, strengthening the EAEU 
as an economic bloc might also give Russia, the union’s most 
important member, more leeway in dealing with China. 
Comparing the EAEU to the USSR would be sim-
ilarly misleading. Unlike the Soviet Union, the EAEU is 
not based on any ideology, and has not established effective 
supranational decision-making bodies. Like the EU, the 
EAEU also has a permanent executive body – the Eura-
sian Economic Commission. But this organ has relatively 
little power. The real power rests with other organizations, 
namely the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, which 
consists of the individual head of states, with a yearly rotat-
ing presidency. 
For the time being, Russia seems not to be inter-
ested in giving more power to the EAEU’s supranational 
institutions because the current arrangements suit Mos-
cow’s interests. As the other member states are also very 
sensitive when it comes to their political sovereignty, it is 
far from certain whether this project will come to resemble 
a Eurasian version of the European Union. What, then, 
can we expect from the EAEU in the future? 
The EAEU is here to stay
If geopolitics have been the main driver behind Russian 
integration efforts, there is also an economic rationale, and 
this is likely to become more important as the integration 
Further Reading
The Eurasian Economic Union: Deals, Rules and the Exercise of Power 
Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk, Chatham House, May 2017 
This comprehensive study provides a critical assessment on the evolu-
tion, achievements and prospects of the EAEU. 
Putin’s and Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union: A Hybrid Half-
Economics and Half-Political ‘Janus Bifrons’ Bruno S. Sergi, Journal of 
Eurasian Studies 9, 2018 
This article examines Russian interests vis-a-vis Eurasian integration, 
evaluating the prospects of this project. 
A Common Energy Market in the Eurasian Economic Union: Implica-
tions for the European Union and Energy Relations with Russia  
Maria Pastukhova and Kirsten Westphal, Stiftung Wissenschaft und  
Politik, February 2018 
This study assesses the implications of the creation of a common EAEU 
energy market and argues for increased EU-EAEU cooperation.
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process continues. The EAEU has achieved harmonization 
of external customs tariffs, it has abolished, at least to a 
large part, internal customs borders, and transferred deci-
sion-making about tariff issues to the union level and away 
from the national states. It has also eliminated internal 
constraints on labor mobility and capital movement and is 
planning to integrate a number of key markets – including 
medical products, transportation, electricity, oil, gas, and fi-
nancial services. Especially ambitious is the plan to create 
a common energy market. By 2019, the union envisions a 
common electricity market, and by 2024 – 25, a common 
market for oil and gas. If accomplished, this would give 
EAEU operators unrestricted and equal access to energy 
networks in other EAEU countries. 
It is unclear whether and when all of these plans 
will be put into practice, but member states have already 
changed regulations and reformed their bureaucracies in 
order to adapt to EAEU directives. A large bureaucratic 
apparatus employing hundreds of people has been set in 
motion to work out further integration plans and draft leg-
islation. Moreover, in order to eliminate obstacles to fur-
ther economic integration, a priority for the coming years 
is the creation of a single digital space across the entire 
union. If properly implemented, this project might yield 
significant economic benefits to all EAEU members, ac-
cording to a joint study by the Eurasian Economic Com-
mission and the World Bank. Given this level of progress 
and the projects already put in motion, it seems unlikely 
that the EAEU will falter any time soon. 
In fact, the more realistic scenario is that the EAEU 
will deepen links between member states. After the diffi-
cult initial years, the EAEU economic zone is showing 
signs of recovery, and the volume of trade among union 
members has been rapidly rising. Further positive news 
will ultimately make the project more attractive for other 
prospective members, or will at least have an effect on third 
parties. For example, Uzbekistan, although not a formal 
EAEU-member, is currently harmonizing its import tar-
iffs with EAEU regulations in order to facilitate economic 
growth and mutual trade with EAEU members. Tajikistan 
is already a member of the Eurasian Development Bank 
(but not yet the EAEU), and both Uzbekistan’s and Tajik-
istan’s populations take a positive view of the EAEU, ac-
cording to opinion polls.
Europe in the off
The EAEU is an economic and political reality with which 
Europe needs to reckon. However, the EU (as well as oth-
er European and Western countries, including Switzer-
land) have refused to establish official relations with the 
organization. This is a result of ongoing tensions between 
the West and Russia, especially the unresolved Ukraine 
crisis. To be sure, as long as the most important decisions 
are still taken at the level of nation states (such as Mos-
cow’s unilateral ban on certain EU imports), it seems logi-
cal that the EU and other Western states continue to deal 
with individual national authorities. However, by not rec-
ognizing the EAEU as a partner, the West is failing to ac-
count for significant changes in the larger Eurasian region. 
While other states, including China, are deepening eco-
nomic and trade cooperation with the EAEU, the Europe-
ans have been standing aside. 
Establishing formalized cooperation would be ad-
visable, especially in light of the EAEU’s intention to cre-
ate a common energy market in the near future. As the 
new regulations will also affect external relations, this is 
likely to have an impact not only on Europe, which is a key 
costumer of Russian and Kazakh oil and gas, but also on 
those countries located in between the two emerging en-
ergy spaces of the EU and the EAEU. Entering into a dia-
logue regarding developments in the energy market could 
create new bridges and facilitate better economic and trade 
relations. Moreover, while the EAEU is expanding and 
modernizing its energy market and transportation infra-
structure, new opportunities for foreign investment, know-
how and technology transfer would open up. A rapproche-
ment with the EAEU would thus not only stimulate trade 
and new business opportunities, but would help to ease 
political tensions. It is thus high time that Europe took ac-
count of what is happening in its eastern vicinity and start-
ed to review its position. 
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